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The Cruelt y of Mercy :
Oxymoron ic Par adoxes
Paula Bolduc
There is a tradition in the Middle East of telling teaching stories in
which Nasrudin is the key character. The stories are humorous and derived
from the wisdom of the Sufis, as well as from Persian, Arabic, and Turkish
cultures. The stories are as timeless and universal, as the lessons they teach. The
following brief Nasrudin story best expresses the fundamental idea in this essay.
One day Nasrudin’s boat overturned. Nasrudin did not know how to
swim and nearly drowned when, just in time, a local fisherman saved him. From
that day on the fisherman pestered Nasrudin for this and that, constantly
reminding him of the fact that he had saved Nasrudin’s life. Finally, after years
of this, the beleaguered Nasrudin wailed, “I wish I had drowned! That would’ve
been less cruel.”1
Mercy is not what it seems. I argue that mercy is accompanied by
cruelty, though not always, and to do that I turn to the wisdom of Seneca,
Machiavelli, Montaigne, and Shakespeare. My primary examples, however,
focus on what Portia in The Merchant of Venice says and how she says it.
The mercy that Shakespeare and Machiavelli identify is not capricious
or blind. Mercy is not always good for the people, writes Machiavelli in The
Prince.2 Machiavelli reasons that there is a necessity for “cruel mercy.” What he
wrote is something like a practical “How to Rule Wisely” manual for first-year
princes. Chapter 15 of The Prince addresses the proper conduct and the
judicious use of cruelty and mercy in order to be kind:
But, it being my intention to write a thing which shall be useful to
him who apprehends it, it appears to me more appropriate to follow up the real
truth of a matter than the imagination of it; for many have pictured republics
and principalities which in fact have never been known or seen.3
Machiavelli’s ultimate concern here is the good of the state. Real mercy
is both merciful and cruel, and to be used only if the situation warrants it. For
Machiavelli, the ruler who lives by virtue alone “soon meets with what destroys
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him among so much that is evil;” and a dead prince is a failed state. As there is
no day without night, there is no mercy without cruelty. Although the
relationship between mercy and cruelty is enough to boggle the mind, one
thing is for sure: mercy without cruelty does not work.
At the end of Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice, a wiser Portia returns
to Belmont and deploys what here is referred to as “cruel mercy.” Machiavelli
and Shakespeare knew well that the truly “noble,” and, of course, the “well-read”
(the creative reader), would find judicious application of cruelty not only
practical, but also kind. In what they write there are echoes of the ancient
wisdom of sages like the first-century stoic, Seneca. In his essay “On Clemency”
Seneca writes: “A ruler’s clemency in itself makes men ashamed of wrongdoing,
and punishment seems more grievous if it is inflicted by a kindly man.”4 The
“clemency” that befalls this ruler’s subject, though it may fall “as the gentle rain,”5
is not exactly benign. Similarly, Montaigne believed that virtue is “something
nobler than the propensity for good.”6 In his essay, “On Cruelty,” Montaigne
explains that the good that is done to others out of unreflective “natural
mildness and good nature” is naïve and untested. With this idea in mind, it
would seem that Shakespeare, who read Montaigne, fashioned Portia in the
mold of Montaigne in The Merchant of Venice.
It is not out of some benign “happy disposition” that Portia argues
most effectively in Venice’s court of justice. On the contrary, she is thoroughly
“provoked and stung to anger.” Who would not be annoyed with such
reactionary seekers of revenge as Shylock, Gratiano and company? But, Portia
takes in hand her indignation and uses what “weapons of reason” she has. The
interesting thing here is that not only is she outraged at Shylock, but also at the
meddlesome Antonio and the impetuous Bassanio. In the end, Portia manages
to save the lives of both the Christian Antonio and the Jew Shylock, but not
Shylock’s freedom of conscience, or his reputation and, most likely, his
livelihood. Moreover, we should not forget that Portia is, from now on,
Bassanio’s guarantor of financial well being.
If all we hear in Portia’s legal argument is the sweet melody of
Christian mercy, then we are selectively deaf to the plainness and brutish
ordinariness of her language. Moreover, we might ignore, as well, what Lorenzo
calls in the play’s final act, her “bad voice.” This “bad voice” refers to the cry of
a cuckoo, the bird that was associated in the Elizabethan period with adultery
and betrayal. This reference to the cuckold underscores the vulnerability of
human relationships as well as the need to examine our assumptions about
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national, sexual, ethnic, and religious differences by listening more closely to
those who think, act, and believe differently.
In this essay, Portia’s “bad voice” is that of the “moral outsider.” Like the
cuckoo that lays it eggs in the nests of other birds, a sort of fowl-usurper (Pardon
the pun.), Portia makes illicit use of Venice’s judicial system; she is a fraud who
deliberately appropriates mercy to her own ends. The suspicion is that Shylock,
as an outsider, is already corrupt, liable to take advantage, and concerned
ultimately only with the welfare of his fellow Jews. Their voices, nonetheless, are
also the voices of valiant rebels who riot against readily-received ideas and
paralyzing traditions. According to Richard Weisberg, in his article titled
“Antonio’s Legalistic Cruelty: Interdisciplinarity and ‘The Merchant of
Venice’:”
Portia is, perhaps fascinated by Shylock’s excessive yet somehow
solid insistence on his bond, committed to undoing the moneylender’s
extreme application of what might otherwise be a righteous and
ethical reliance on written law. But she is equally repulsed by the overly
flexible oathbreaking of the Christian characters.7
Portia finds, between the extremes of the strict application of the law
and unconditional mercy, the advantages of “cruel mercy.” She knows that both
Shylock’s distempered voluntary causation of suffering”8 and the equally
noxious abuse “of the right to punish”9 hang together. The Duke fails to
neutralize Shylock’s intransigence by giving the Jew back his life and instead
fines him, confiscates half his property and gives it to Antonio. According to the
“Alien Statute” in Venice at the time, the state had the right to take Shylock’s life
and to claim his property. Nothing in the law, however, stipulated a forced
conversion to Christianity, one of three conditions demanded by Antonio. Our
tendency to focus exclusively on mercy ignores the blatant cruelty in having
such a statute in the first place. Moreover, Portia, and surprisingly Shylock
himself, seem oblivious or inured to this diktat. Their silence is deafening.
Nevertheless, Weisberg’s Portia grows weary of “Christian distortion
of the law – where ostensible ‘mercy’ quickly is debased to forms of legalized
cruelty unimaginable” to a Jew. Christian casual flouting of the law in Venice,
along with Antonio’s subtle overstepping of the Alien Statute, adds a distinctive
poignancy to the often-cited “Hath not a Jew eyes?” passage in Act 3:
Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hand, organs, dimensions,
senses, affections, passions? Fed with the same food, hurt with the
same weapons… If you prick us, do we not bleed? .... And if you wrong
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us, shall we not revenge? If we are like you in the rest, we will resemble
you in that…. The villainy you teach me I will execute, and it shall go
hard but I will better the instruction.”
Antonio and his friends, who have in the past abused Shylock and,
likely, his kin, may remind us of what Pope Benedict XVI recently said of the
victims who were sexually abused by Roman Catholic clergy. The New York
Times quotes the Pope: “Indeed the victims of hardship and despair, whose
human dignity is violated with impunity, become easy prey to the call to
violence, and they can then become violators of peace.”10 Although the contexts
are admittedly very different, the emphasis of this essay is on the similarity
between Shylock as a socially abused Jew and the persons sexually abused as
victims likely to become, in turn, social or sexual predators.
Responding to Shylock’s refusal to be merciful, Portia becomes her
most eloquent in her memorable speech:
The quality of mercy is not strained.
It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
Upon the place beneath. It is twice blest:
It blesseth him that gives and him that takes.
‘Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes
The throned monarch better than his crown.
His scepter shows the force of temporal power,
The attribute to God himself;
And earthly poser doeth then show likest God’s
When mercy seasons justice.
Having effectively argued her case, Portia leaves Venice to return to
Belmont. Once the dissimulating lover-lawyer, she now is the rich heiress of the
enchanted, idyllic Belmont.
In her dealings with both the Christians and the Jew in court, and
later in Belmont at the play’s end, Portia is obviously disgruntled with trite
definitions of love, mercy, and justice. Hoping to have left behind one legal
ritualistic sacrifice, she must now face another rite: the hyperbolic oath-swearing
between Antonio and Bassanio. The first thing Bassanio says to Portia when he
sees her is: “Give welcome to my friend, / This is the Man, this is Antonio/ To
whom I am so infinitely bound” . Portia knows well who he is, having rescued
him from his bond with Shylock. Still, she must now deal with this most
interfering and tiresome of men. Antonio, the ubiquitous meddler, ever too
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quick to provide “surety” for Bassanio’s hasty promises of love and fidelity, is
hardly a corrective for an irresolute Bassanio. Portia confronts him with the
plain and honest fact of his inconstancy: “If you had known the virtue of the
ring, / Of half her worthiness that gave the ring, / Or your own honor to
contain the ring, / You would not then have parted with the ring.” Bassanio’s
ears must be ringing – each line ends with a “ring”! He is not the only one
reminded of the preciousness of “bonding.” Gratiano, the blowhard, must also
heed her stern reminder: “You were to blame – I must be plain with you – / To
part so slightly with your wife’s first gift, / A thing stuck on with oaths upon
your finger, / And so riveted with faith unto your flesh.” A thing “so riveted” in
flesh is bound to hurt if kept and hurt if broken: a thing of cruel mercy – an
unkind kindness – an oxymoronic paradox.
An older, more magnanimous Justice John Paul Stevens, in his recent
opinion regarding the use of lethal injection, argues that though experience has
taught him otherwise, “the imposition of the death penalty represents ‘the
pointless and needless extinction of life with only marginal contributions to
any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns
to the State [is] patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative
of the Eight Amendment.” Although he once sided with the majority in voting
on the death penalty in 1976 as a new Supreme Court Justice, he now finds
reason to reverse his opinion. More than 30 years later, Justice Stevens finds
that he is “bound” to agree with the majority, but also “bound” to the “voices”
that call for an end to the death penalty. Like Justice Stevens, a more experienced
Portia in Belmont understands that even in Belmont “cruel mercy” is kind. She
becomes the voice of human solidarity at the instant she challenges the
traditions of exclusivity subtly ritualized in Venice’s court of justice. Shakespeare,
Machiavelli, Seneca, and Montaigne recognize that the complex messiness of
forging human relationships that are based on an intended merciful fairness
that in the end is liable to conceal cruelty. These writers teach us about the dark
side of mercy.
I would like to conclude with another Nasrudin story. This one is
called “The Reason.” Nasrudin was looking to borrow some money from a rich
man. When the man asked why, Nasrudin answered, “To buy an elephant.” The
rich man said: “if you need a loan, then you can’t afford an elephant.” To which
Nasrudin replied: “I came to get money, not advice.”11
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